T is admi'tted that a sound public opinion cannot exist without access to the news. There is today a widespread and a growing doubt whether there exists such an access to the news about contentious affairs. This doubt ranges from accusations of unconscious bias to downright charges of corruption, from the belief that the news is colored to the belief that the news is poisoned.
On so grave a matter evidence is needed. The study which follows is a piece of evidence.
It deals with the reporting of one great event in the recent history of the world.
That event is the Russian Revolution from March, 1917 , to March, 1920 . The analysis covers thirty-six months and over one thousand issues of a daily newspaper.
The authors have examined all news items about Russia in that period in the newspaper selected; between three and four thousand items were noted.
Little attention was paid to editorials.
The New York Times was selected as the medium through which to study the news, first because the Times, as great as any newspaper in America, and far greater than the majority, has the means for securing news, sec,ond, because the makeup of the news in the Times is technically admirable, third, because the Times index is an enormous convenience to any student of contemporary history, fourth, because the bound volumes are easily accessible, and fifth, because the Times is one of the really great newspapers of the world.
The Russian Rev801ution was selected as the topic, because of its intrinsic importance, and because it has aroused the kind of passion which tests most seriously lthe objectivity of reporting. The first question, naturally, is what constitutes the test of accuracy. 3 A definitive account of the Russian Revolution does not exist. In all probability it will never exist in this generation. After a hundred years there is no undisputed history of the French Revolution, and scholars are still debating the causes and the meaning of the revolt of the Gracchi, the fall of Rome, and even of the American Revolution and the American Civil War. A final history of the Russian Revolution may never be written, and even a tolerably settled account is not conceivable for a long time.
It would be footless therefore to propose an absolute measurement of news gathered amid such excitement and con----w --2 THE NEW REPUBLIC fusion. It would be equally vain to accept the account of one set of witnesses in preference to any other set. i
The "whole truth" about Russia is not to be / had, and consequently no attempt is made by the /' authors to contrast the news accounts with any other account which pretends to be the "real truth" or the "true truth." A totally different standard of measurement is used here. The reliability of the news is tested in this study by a few definite and decisive happenings about which there is no dispute.
Thus there is no dispute that the offensive of the Russian army under Kerensky in July 1917 was a disastrous failure; no dispute that the Provisional Government was overthrown by the Soviet power in November 1917; no dispute that the Soviets made a separate peace with Germany at Brest-Litovsk in March 19 18 ; no dispute that the campaigns of Kolchak, Denikin, and Yudenitch were a failure; no dispute that the Soviet G,overnment was still in existence in March 1920, Against such salient facts the daily reports about Russia in this period are measured.
The only question asked is whether the reader of ;the news was given a picture of various phases of the revolution which survived the test of events, or whether he was misled into believing that the outcome of events would be radically different from the actual outcome.
would support Allied intervention.
It was important to know whether the Soviet Government was bound to collapse soon under Allied pressure.
It was important to know whether the White GeneralsKolchak, Denikin, Yudenitch were, or were not, winning their campaigns.
It was important to know whether Poland was defending herself or invading Russia.
It was important to know the disposition of the Soviet Government toward peace at the time of the peace conference.
It was important to know whether there was a Red Peril before Allied troops entered Russia, or whether that peril dates from the German surrender.
It was important to know whether the Red regime was tottering to its fall or marching to the military conquest of the world. On each one of these questions depended some aspect of policy involving lives, trade, finance, and national honor.
It is important now to know what was 'the net effect of the news on these points.
For the reader's convenience certain tentative conclusions from the evidence are stated here:
I. From the overthrow of the Czar to the failure of the Galician offensive in July 1917. The difficulties in Russia, and especially in the Russian army, are not concealed from the attentive reader, but the dominant tendency of the captions and the emphasis 'is so 'optimistic as to be misleading.
(See Section I.) The question of atrocities and of the merits or demerits of the Soviets is not raised.
Thus, for example, there was a Red Terror officially proclaimed by the Soviet Government in the summer of I 9 I 8 ; and apart from the official terror, excesses occurred in many parts of Russia.
No attempt is made here to sift the truth of the accounts, to determine whether there were exaggerations, or how far the White Terror equalled the Red Terror. The attempt is not made because no dependable account is available with which to measure the news reports.
There was a round measure of truth in the report of terror and atrocity.
For analogous reasons no discussion of the virtues and defects of the Soviet system is attempted.
There are no authoritative reports. Able and disinterested observers furnish contradictory evidence .out of which no objective criteria emerge. Under these circumstances an accurate report of the Soviet Government and the Terror is no doubt more than could have been expected from a newspaper.
But what might more reasonably have been expected and what was more immediately important for Americans, was to know in the summer of 19 17 whether the Russian army would fight, and whether the Provisional Government would survive. It was important to know in the winter of whether the Soviet Government would make a separate peace. It was important to know in the spring and early summer of 1918 whether the Russian people 2. From the military disaster in July 1917 to the Bolshevik revolution of N,ovember. The difficulties of the regime play a bigger part in the news, but a misleading optimism still continues.
In this period, the tendency to seek a solution through a dictator-savior appears in the mistaken hope placed upon the Kornilov adventure, a hope quickly falsified by his collapse.
It may fairly be said that the growth of ,the Bolshevik power from July to November must have been seriously underestimated in view of the success of the November coup.
(See Section II.) 3. From the Bolshevik revolution to the ratification of the treaty of Brest-Litovsk.
This period is on the whole the best in the three years. Different points of view are ,given, and the emphasis is generally neutral. After the recovery from the shock of ,the second revolution, the reports are inspired by an eager curiosity about the diplomatic battle between the Bolsheviks and the enemy. At the height of this diplomatic battle the news is handled in a rather ur&tically proBolshevik fashion, as a result of the optimistic assumption that the Soviets would refuse to make peace with Germany.
(See Section III.) Azdgust 4, 1920 August 4, 1920 THE NEW REPUBLIC 3 4. Fr,om the ratification at Brest-Litovsk, which coincided approximately with the Great German <offensive in March 1918, to the decision for Allied intervention in August 1918. Under the stress of disappointment and danger the tone and quality of the news change radically.
Organized propaganda for 'intervention penetrates the news. This propaganda has two phases. There is a short and intense period in late March and early April, which stops rather suddenly with the announcement that the President has decided against intervention.
There is a prolonged and intense period beginning about May which culminates in ,the American approval of intervention.
(See Secti,on IV.) 5. The months immediately following the signing of the armistice.
The Red Peril, which had hitherto played #only an insignificant rble, now takes precedence in the news from Russia and serves as a new motive for Allied intervention.
(See Section V.) 6. The Spring, Summer Once more, with the failuresof the White Armies, the Red Peril reappears. The news as a whole is dominated by the hopes of the men who composed the news organization. They began as passionate partisans in a great war in which their own country's future was at stake. Until the armistice they were interested in defeating Germany.
They hoped until they could hope no longer that Russia would fight. When they saw she could not fight, they worked for intervention as part of the war against Germany.
When the war with Germany was over, the intervention still existed.
They found reasons then for continuing the intervention.
The German Peril as the reas,on for intervention ceased with the armistice; the Red Peril almost immediately afterwards supplanted it. The Red Peril in turn gave place to rejoicing over the hopes of the White Generals. When these hopes died, the Red Peril reappeared. In the large, the news about Russia is a case 'of seeing not what was, but what men wished to see.
This deduction is more important, in the opinion of the authors, than any other.
The chief censor and the chief propagandist were hope and fear in the minds of reporters and editors. They wanted to win the war; they wanted to ward ofI bolshevism.
These subjective obstacles to the free pursuit of facts account for the tame submission of enterprising men to the objective censorship and propaganda under which they did their work. For subjective reasons they accepted and believed most of what they were told by the State Department, the so-called Russian Embalssy in Washington, the Russian Information Bureau in New York, the Russian Committee in Paris, and the agents and adherents of the old regime all over Europe.
Fo; the same reason they endured the attention of officials at crucial points like Helsingfors, Omsk, Vladivostok, Stockholm, Copenhagen, London and Paris.
For the same reason they accepted reports of governmentally controlled news services abroad, and of correspondents who were unduly intimate with the various secret services and with members of the old Russian nobility.
From the point of view of professional journalism the reporting of the Russian Revolution is nothing short of a disaster.
On the essential questions the net effect was almost always misleading, and misleading news is worse than none at all. Yet on the face of the evidence there is no reason to charge a conspiracy by Americans.
They can fairly be charged with boundless credulity, and an untiring readiness to be gulled, and on many occasions with a downright lack of common sense. Whether they were "giving the public what it wants" or creating a public that took what it got, is beside the point.
They were performing the supreme duty in a democracy of supplying the inf'ormation on which public opinion feeds, and they were derelict in that duty. Their motives may have been excellent.
They wanted to win the war; they wanted to save the world.
They were nervously excited by exciting events.
They were baffled by the complexity of affairs, and the obstacles created by war. But whatever the excuses, the apologies, and the extenuation, the fact remains that a great people in a supreme crisis could not secure the minimum of necessary information on a supremely important event.
When that truth has burned itself into men's consci,ousness, they will examine the news in regard to other events, and begin a searching inquiry into the sources of public opinion. T'hat is the indispensable preliminary to a fundamental task ,of the Twentieth Century: the insurance to a free people of such a supply of news that a free government can be successfully administered. In devoting so long a study to the work of a single newspaper the authors have proceeded without animus against the Times, and with much admiration for its many excellent qualities. They . 4 THE NEW REPUBLIC August 4, 1920 trust that the readers of this report, among them nothing were to be accomplished beyond a score in the proprietors and editors of the "Times," will the duel between liberal and conservative, then this not regard it as an "exposure" of the Times, report would not have been made. Something much but as a piece of inductive evidence on the problem greater is at issue, for the reliability of the news of the news. The authors do not wish to imply, is the premise on, which democracy proceeds. because honestly they do not believe, that the less A great .newspaper is ,a public service inconservative press is necessarily more reliable.
As stitution. It occupies a position in public life fully editors of a liberal weekly journal they know from as important .as the school system or the church experience that there are large glass windows in or the organs of government.
It is entitled to their own house, and they are keenly aware of the criticism, and subject to criticism, as they are. The fact that reliability is harder to attain in the haste value of such criticism is directly proportionate to of a daily newspaper than in the greater deliberathe steadiness with which the ultimate end of a tion of a periodical.
If, consequently, nothing were better news system is clearly and dispassionately at stake but the question of praise and blame, if kept in mind.
I. To the July Offensive
The Russian Revolution occurred during the war with Germany.
It was an event that affected immediately and directly the lives, the fortunes, and the dearest hopes of all nations engaged in the war. The Revolution began during the second week of March in the year 1917. This date is highly significant.
It is about six weeks after the German Government had announced unlimited submarine war, and six weeks after the rupture of diplomatic relations by America. Thus, the circumstances of the Revolution were not such as to invite impartial inquiry. What the reader of newspapers was chiefly concerned about was the fighting power ,of Russia on the great eastern front.
He could hardly have expected a current history of so vast a revolution.
He did expect, and he had reason to demand, reliable reports about the morale and strength of Russia's armies. For on those reports he had t,o arrive at judgments of supreme practical importance.
The reliability of the news for the first four months can fairly be measured by this one concrete test: did it give a tolerably true account of Russia's military strength? Did the news lead to correct or incorrect expectations?
The actual military power of Russia was tested against Germany just once. In July 1917, about three and a half months after the Revolutionb the army attacked on a wide front in Galicia. After a small initial success the offensive collapsed, the Germans attacked and pierced the Russian front; Such was the official public British theory.
In the same issue Mr. Bonar Law (unidentified dispatch from London, March IS*) was quoted as saying that the ievolution was due to Russia's purpose to fight the war out. This was, of course, not a statement of fact, but the expression of a wish.
This wish was father to much of the news which followed for several months.
Concurrently, there were, however, other interpretations of the Revolution.
On Mar'ch 16 the Times published, of *A dispatch is called "unidentified" when it has no other reference to source beyond place of origin and date. That is, the carrying agent is not named. there were mutinies followed by a rout.
The of-, _ -_ He was in a position to guess that the striking power of Russia was not great, if he read all the obscurely placed dispatches, read between the lines of the other dispatches, and sternly declined to let his hopes govern his judgment.
But if he read casually, and chiefly the captions and emphasized news, the impression of hopefulness, or at least of whistling to keep up hope, would have been strong.
Captions or prominent news on the following days all of them stated or implied a Russian will to fight.
March
16~, 28, 19, 20, 21, 23, 27, 29, 11 items. April 2, 10, 12, 14, 18, 19~, 202, 21, 22, 242, .28, 29, 17 items. May 31 4, 7, 9, 12, 13, 17, 18, 19, 20, 212, 23, 25, 282, 292, 19 items. J une 2, 3, 42y 5, 62, 7, g2, 9, 11, 13'~ 15, 16, 17, Ig2, '9, 212, 22, 23, 242, 2S2, 272, 282, 29, 35 items. Total 62 issues, 82 items. Thus oftener than every other day for the whole period the reader was assured that Russia would fight, or that the Russian army was strong, or that the difficulties were being surmounted.
Ordeal by battle proved all these assurances to be false.
Was When there were at least 49 official assurances and thirty odd more from sources of recognized authority in a period of 107 days it is not surprising that the net tone of the news about Russia was optimistic.
It is even less surprising when the character of the 66 pessimistic items is examined. If we add together the distinctly unpopular and therefore incredible sources, th'at is the German, the Bolshevik, the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies, and the items tagged and peppered with epithets, the total is 36.
Thus out of 82 optimistic items, 49 are from friendly official sources, and the rest from respectable ones; out of 66 pessimistic items 36 are distinctly disreputable, and of the thirty remaining practically none contains more than a fragmentary hint of the real difficulty ifi Russia as later revealed by the collapse of the July offensive, the first Bolshevik rebellion, and the ultimate fall of the Provisional Government.
It remains to be noted however that the optimistic items carried their own antidote to the sophisticated reader.
The very fact that it was necessary to proclaim the solidarity and strength of Russia every other day was a suspicious fact. Reiteration emphasized doubt, and tr.ained readers were enabled to reach conclusions quite opposite from those insisted upon in the general intent of the news. But what chance had they of persuading the casual reader that Russian affairs required his earnest attention.
Was the casual reader, absorbed in our own war activities, not told about every other day that he could afford to be complacent ?
II. The Prelude to Bolshevism Misleading Optimism
The military weakness #of Russia was clear to all observers on the spot after what Kerensky calls the "T,arnopol disgrace" of July 19. The condition of the army was explained by the Russian official communiqui (British Admiralty per Wireless Press, Petrograd, July 22) ; the condition behind the lines was indicated by the abortive Bolshevik rebellion of July 16-18. The most obvious facts rio longer justified the complacency which had dominated the news. "Something" had to be done by somebody. There were, roughly speaking, three parties contending for power; the Left led by the Bolsheviks, the center led by Kerensky, and the Right led by someone in the r&le of a Dictator-Savior. The Bolshevik uprising of July was suppressed by Kerensky's government.
For the next two months the contenders, on the surface at least, are the Right and the Center parties.
The Kornilov rebellion in September was the first of the many efforts of the Right to establish a Dictator-Savior.
The rebellion was easily put down by Kerensky.
The government had thus survived first an attack from the Left, and then an attack from the Right.
But within a few days of the suppression of Kornilov there is un- Is it not just ,to say that the newspaper is a misleading optimist which regards the capture of 1,000 prisoners as of greater significance than the collapse of the whole front down to the Carpathians? It was not always possible, of course, to extract hope out of a desperate situation, 'but on fourteen days out of twenty-two the Icaption writer succeeds. On .the following dates he announces reverses: July 20, 21, 23, 26, 27, 28, 31, Aug. 3, x7, 23, "The Figaro today asks if the moment has not arrived for Japan to take further steps in the war . . . .
The Petit Journal, in an editorial along the same lines . . . ., adds that never will the Japanese troops be more needed on the Russian front than they are today." [Italics ours.] The reader will note the common inspiration of these French newspapers and the synchronism 'of the publication with the bad news of the German offensive against Riga.
With such estimates of the Russian problem in their minds, and with such prepossessions, it is not surprising that the newsmen were completely taken in by the Kornilov fiasco.
The Kornilov Rebellion
The historical evidence about the affair is still a matter of hot dispute, and there is much mystery about the role of the various personalities who figured prominently in the intrigue. This aspect of the affair the correspondents did not report at length, and could not have been expected to report. But the facts which concerned the American reader were simple.
Did Kornilov represent the power of Russia?
Were those who gathered ab,out him the effective substance of the nation?
Was he, in brief, the real thing, or a flash in the pan?
He was a distinguished officer of the General Staff, a Cossack, who had been appointed commander-in-chief by Kerensky himself after the defeat of July. According to his own proclamation,* issued September 9, his purpose in rebelling against the Provisional Government of Kerensky and starting to march on Petrograd, was "the preservation of a Great Russia."
He swore "to carry .over the people, by means of a victory over the enemy, to the Constituent Assembly at which it will decide its own fate and choose the order of the new state life."
He was, in other words, to be a temporary military dictator acting as a savior of his country. Kerensky in a proclamation*, also issued September 9, denounced him as a counter-revolutionist, News of the actual revolt was cabled that same day from London.
"There is yet no indication of General Kornilov's intentions," said a special dispatch to the Times, "but it is known that the Cossacks, the backbone of the Russian Army, are his strong adherents." Ye:t two days later the Kornilov revolt was a confessed fiasco.
"Kornilov Gives Up, Revolt Ends," said a headline in the Times, September 14. Where, one wonders, were the Cossacks who three days before were "known" in London to be Kor-. nilov's "strong adherents"
and "the backbone of the Russian Army" ? A fortnight later Mr. Harold Williams, in a special to the Times from Petro-grad, dated September 26, blurted out the following :
"The Kornilov affair has intensified mutual distrust and completed the work of destruction.
The
Government is shadowy and unreal, and what personality it had has disappeared before the menace of the democratic conference. Whatever power there is, is again concentrated in the hands of the Soviets, and, as always happens when the Soviets secure a monopoly of power, the influence of the Bolsheviks has increased enormously." [Italics ours.] So runs the obituary by a friend of the first Dictator-Savior.
In view of the fact that the Soviets seized the government six weeks after this dispatch was filed, Mr. Williams had reported news of the first importance.
Does the news for the next six weeks, the last weeks before the triumph of Bolshevism, follow the lead given so clearly by Mr. Williams?
The End of Kerensky
The news out of Russia for the first ten days of October does not minimize the increasing difficulties of the existing rkgime.
But the news comment out of Washington on October IO (unidentified dispatch from Washington, October 9)) is this:
"Russian diplomats here appear to be convinced now that the Bolsheviks have been finally overthrown and that Premier Kerensky is once more firmly established in the supreme power.
"It was said at the embassy today that the Bolsheviks were greatly discouraged by their first attempt to obtain control of the Government, on July 8, when disturbances caused by them were suppressed by the provisional authorities, and again during the Kornilov movement, when the Bolsheviks seized upon that occasion to overthrow the coalition administration. The action of the democratic conference in upholding the principle of a coalition Cabinet was asserted to reveal the total defeat of the extreme radicals." The reader who had ignored the State Department and the Russian Embassy for the six weeks preceding, and had read the news dispatches from Russia, had no reason to be surprised.
Nevertheless
The reader who had trusted official pronouncements was misled.
The Prsvisional Government having been overthrown by the Soviets, he was concerned in the weeks that followed, was greater, the prospects of the White Generals were brighter, the menace was smaller, and the problem of peace might be postponed.
If on the other hand, the Soviet power was firmly rooted in the Russian people, then it was Russia, and its diplomacy mattered enormously, intervention was impracticable, the prospects of the generals poor, the menace worth serious consideration, and peace a pressing matter. The Soviet Government was still in existence in March, 1920, when It seemed only to be a question of who would follow next:
"Officials are now debating whether Premier Kerensky, General Kornilov, or some other leader will take charge of the Government to rise out of the ashes of Maximalist authority.
The complete overthrow of the Bolsheviki is predicted."
Many times, in the months which followed, that overthrow was predicted.
No other note appeared more faithfully and with emphasis so certain. In the two years from November, 1917 , to November, 1919 no less than ninety-one times was it stated that the Soviets were nearing their rope's end, or actually had reached it.
In arriving at this computation no count is made of the ordinary reports that Russia was in chaosthough such reports of course implied a weakening in the prestige and authority of the government attempting to wield power. What is counted, in arriving at the figure ninety-one, are reports more explicitly reporting an early break-up. For instance, thirty different times the power of the Soviets was definitely described as being on the wane. Twenty times there was news of a serious counterrevolutionary menace.
Five times was the explicit statement made that the regime was certain to collapse. And fourteen times that collapse was said to be in progress.
Four times Lenin and Trotzky were planning flight. Three times they had already fled.
Five times the Soviets were "tottering." Three times their fall was "imminent." Once THE NEW REPUBLIC II desertions in the Red army had reached proportions alarming to the government. Twice Lenin planned retirement; once he had been killed; and three times he was thrown in prison.
Insistently appearing in the news, the steady repetition in these reports left its inevitable impression on the reader.
How trustworthy were the sources from which this material was drawn?
The smaller part of it came via the shortest route available:
that is, as the observation of men major theme in a Wagnerian opera, comes this note of Soviet impermanency.
What its net effect has been is plain.
It has nourished the policy of laissez-faire.
Creating the impression that a few days more and there would be no Soviet power left to worry over, it helped postpone from month to month an insistence that in the face of definite fact the Allied statesmen must revaluate their policy of indecision, intervention and blockade.
or of some group of men who, whatever their personal bias-even though it be the bias that might During the Parleys at Brestaccompany a salary coming from some rival Russian faction -were at least cited by name as authority for the news. That method accounts for twenty of the dispatches tallied in the present list. On certain other occasions there was an official or pseudo-official source implied. Thus we have "advices to the State Department," "officials of the State Department,"
and "government and diplomatic sources in Washington"-each quoted in one instance.
Six more dispatches were drawn from statements or publications credited to the Soviet government itself.
That brings the total up to twenty-nine, all accounted for with sources possessing some measure of authority.
Sixty-two are left. And for those sixty-two there is less that can be said.
The source of information, where cited, is vague a,t best: "sources familiar with the Russian situation in its many phases" (London)
; a Stockholm dispatch to Paris; the opinion of some man or group of men unnamed; "reports reaching London from Petrograd"
; "reports reaching London from Peking and Copenhagen"; dispatches from Copenhagen to the Exchange Telegraph Company, London; correspondents of German newspapers, of Swedish papers and of Danish papers; unidentified dispatches from Reval, from Geneva, from Stockholm and from Helsingfors etc. Individually the sending of a news dispatch based upon second-, third-or fourth-hand authority was a natural enough procedure.
A correspondent in Copenhagen, perhaps, saw in some Danish journal a report coming from Stockholm that someone else believed counter-revolution menaced the Soviet authority.
That was "news," he judged, worth cabling to America.
Collectively, however, the reports have no such incidental character. From the first days of Soviet power they have painted a picture which the event itself has proved to be misleading.
They have prophecied what did not happen.
But they have left, in the minds of those who read them, an effect of real importance.
Later themes find expression. At times the Red Peril momentarily overshadows the conception of Soviet power as an institution verging on collapse. But over a space of many months, recurring like the
Litovsk
The midwinter of 19 17-18 is worth more detailed examination, because it has a character of its own.
News items suggesting that the regime was temporary appeared as follows. This tabulation is more inclusive than that asbove for reasons of fairness which will be evident.
It is more inclusive in that items merely suggesting weakness are admi'tted, whereas they are excluded above. that the Russian masses were forcing the hands of the Bolsheviks by demanding the execution of promises.
In the issue of Decem:ber 5 1Mr. Williams says (Special to the Times from Petrograd, December 3) that:
"The Bolshevist movement is by no means simple. It is a curious jumble of conflicting elements ranging from the purest idealism to German intrigue and reactionary monarchism. These elements are temporarily agreed in a peace policy, and derive their authority from the strong pacifist tendencies of the soldiers and Socialists and the pacifist mood of the u~orkmen. . . . In any case, the fact must be faced that, one way or the other, Russia, despite the will of the best elements of the population, will have to retire from the war. . . . We cannot contemptuously abandon this whole, great people because of a temporary fit of madness, the causes of which lie deep in the history of years of oppression. to Kerensky, were treated without obvious prejudice once 'they were established, and while they were still defying Germany.
The judgment of reporters and caption-writers was governed, on the whole uniformly, by the will to believe that Russia would assist the Allies.
That the events falsified this optimism again and again shows how strongly the wish intruded upon objective judgment.
For while reporters in Russia did advert on numerous occasions to the basic demoralization of the war-weary people, those dispatches flickered and disappeared in the prevailing desire to maintain an eastern front.
That this motive was stronger initially than any hatred of Bolshevism, any fear of the Red Peril, is shown rather emphatically by the very friendly character of the news during the negotiations at Brest-Litovsk. The informal recognition of the Soviet Government by Great Britain, the idealization of Russia contained in President
Wilson's address of January 8, elation over the strikes in Germany and Austria, and a good deal of war-weariness in Western Europe,-all coincide with news about Russia which is, to say the least, sympathetic to the Soviets.
REPUBLIC I3
From the Revolution of March, 1917 , to the final collapse of the eastern front in early February, 1918 , it is just to say that a strong bias is reflected in the presentation of the news. It is the bias of hope, and this bias persistently plays down news of Russia's weakness and plays up announcements and events which sustain hope. There were plenty of exceptions, of course, and we have tried faithfully to give them full value in what has preceded. We assert nothing more than the existence of a dominant tendency in the general course of the news, a tendency contradicted by indisputable events. Up to this point at least, we do not believe that on the face of the news any case appears pointing to the existence of an organized propaganda working behind the censorship.
The evidence, in our opinion, disproves such a charge, and vindicates the good will of those who prepared and reported the news. The difficulties revealed are professional: where the news is misleading in the net effect it is because the emphasis has been misplaced by the powerful passions of a great war.
The period which follows the withdrawal of Russia shows a radical change in the character of the news. In order to understand that change it is necessary to recall that the final loss of Russia was a frightful disappointment, that the German offensive of March was the supreme military crisis of Ithe war. The period we are approaching now transcends all others in its desperate significance.
It begins with what looked to the western world like downright betrayal, for the Allies stood face to face with a Germany freed from Russian pressure on the eastern front.
These facts bear heavily on the quality of the news which follows.
The patriotic men who were engaged in furnishing the news about Russia had hoped in vain through twelve anxious months.
That the threshold of their credulity was almost immediately lowered should surprise no one.
IV.
The Appeal for Intervention On February I 2, 19 18, the Times published its obituary on Russia as a belligerent.
On February 26 appeared the famous Grasty interview with Foch.
(Sp ecial to the New York Times, Paris, February 25) :
"If America will look ahead I am sure she will see another field in which she can render immense service without relaxing her efforts on the western front. She should give her attention to the Orient.
"Germany is walking through Russia. America and Japan, who are in a position to do so, should go to meet her in Siberia. Both for the war and after America and Japan must furnish military and economic resistance to German penetration. There should be immediate steps in this important matter. Don't wake up after it is too late. Don't wait until the enemy has too much of a start. . . ." Japanese and British marines landed at Vladivostok early in April, and British troops on the Murman peninsula.
Towards the end of May the Czechoslovak troops in Russia were in conflict with the Soviets.
In July American troops were landed in Vladivostok;
in August American troops were landed in Archangel.
On It is also one of the most significant things about it. The notion of a fundamental antagonism between the Soviet government and the American is not insisted upon until after American troops are on Russian soil.
(See Section V of this report.)
The great reason for military action displayed in the news is the German domination of Russia. It is Foch's reason in February;
it is Senator King's reason in his Senate resolution of June 10th; it is Mr. Taft's reason the same day.
(Times of June I I.)
The argument was simple : ,the eastern front is gone.
Germany has an unblocked path through Russia and Siberia to the Pacific, through Russia and the Caucasus to India.
Germany will organize Russian resources and perhaps Russian man power; then she will win the war. Somewhere or other an eastern front must be reestablished.
The Bolsheviks will not and cannot do this. The problem is therefore to be solved by Allied, Japanese, and American soldiers cooperating with Russian anti-Bolsheviks.
The providential rebellion of the Czechoslovaks in May, June and July provides the nucleus.
This argument dominates the news in the Times up to August, and more or less until the armistice with Germany.
The armistice, of course, destroyed the argument.
But the intervention continued. After the armistice intervention is justified by the Red Peril; before the armistice it is justified by the German Peril.
Little fighting was done by American troops in Russia before the armistice. These troops went to fight Germany and remained to fight Russians.
The German Peril
The news looking towards intervention is thickest from just after Foch's interview to just before the great German offensive of March 21.
It declines rather suddenly after the President had vetoed the idea, and then begins again strongly in May with increasing intensity through June and July up to the time of the President's conversion.
The first unsuccessful phase in early March, 1918 , is before the fright caused by the German success. The second successful phase coincides with the farthest advance of the Germans towards Paris. President Wilson's final decision on August 4 is four days before the day which Ludendorff calls the turning point of the war. Thus intervention was launched as part of the grand strategy of the war against Germany.
Th e news is all to that effect. "Sees Russia Now as Ally of Germany"-"Germans Overrun Siberia"-"Germany Boasts an Open Route to India"-"German Leads Bolshevist Army"-"Bolsheviki Yield Russia's Riches to Berlin"-"Russians Sell Out to the Germans"-these are headlines typical of the items we have listed under "German Domination of Russia," in the months between Russia's withdrawal from the war and the formal acceptance of the policy of intervention by the American Government.
Occasionally dispatches come through presenting another picture. It is reported, for instance (as in the Times on June 17), that Germany is finding her Russian venture somewhat disappointing in its results. But these reports are not followed up, verified, or insisted upon.
The accepted news is ,that Germany is dominating Russia. Assuming the substance of this news to be true, there was still a practical question.
Vladivostok was 5,000 miles from the old Russian front.
The only other entrance to Russia was on the Arctic Ocean. The Japanese alone had an army to use, if they were willing to use it, and they were over 5,000 miles from Germany.
Archangel and Murmansk were August 4, 1920 THE NEW REPUBLIC gates to Russia, though bad ones, but there was no army of any size that could be diverted to that front before the armistice.
All the other gates to Russia were blocked.
These elementary considerations do not figure very much in the news.
The practical difficulty is met, when it is met at all, by news of anti-Bolshevists in Russia ready to roll up around and behind a small allied army.
These anti-Bolshevists and their intentions were crucial, for unless they existed and wanted intervention and were ready to fight, the meager allied forces available would be lost in a wilderness. The reality of the antiBolshevik uprising was tested by military campaigns under Kolchak, Denikin, and Yudenitch.
The news of these campaigns is discussed in sections VI to XI.
Beside the appeal to reason there was a vast amount of news directly advocating or directly forecasting the much desired intervention.
The interested reader will find more than one hundred and forty news items bearing directly upon intervention in the months between February and July.
All this leaves out of account the vast amount of opinion and feature material frankly aimed to persuade the reader.
It was even reported, in 'the guise of news, that intervention would have a quieting effect on Russian politics.
Thus a dispatch from Tokio, dated August 3 :
"It is predicted in well-informed circles here that the present concerted action by the Allies in Siberia will act as a sedative on the situation. . . ."
That the news columns in this period were used to persuade the readers of the wisdom of a certain policy, held by the Times itself, will hardly be disputed.
Take a front page dispatch like the follow- was the necessity of reconstituting some sort of an eastern front to face the Germans.
As the foregoing section disclosed, in the five and a half months tha't elapsed between the withdrawal of Russia from the war and the formal acceptance of the policy of intervention by the American government, ,the Red Peril played an insignificant part in the hot discussion over intervention in Russia's internal affairs.
Germany had the front of the stage. Upon the notion of a Peril that would sweep 'out of Russia and attack western civilization there was practically no emphasis. This continued to be the situation in the first days following the landing of Allied and American troops on Russian soil. There were, to be sure, a few warnings that Lenin either had declared war' upon one or more members of the Entente, or soon intended making such a declaration. * But in August, Septem'ber and Octoberin the days immediately preceding the end of the war-it was still ,the anti-German note that predominated.
On It was about this time (September 15 to 21, inclusive) that the Sisson documents were published -proving, in the eyes of the Times, that the Bolshevists had ruled Russia "as German valets." That was still the loud note in the news from Russia during these days when the war in Europe was drawing near its close. On October zo-twentytwo days before the armistice-the Times publishtd this news in a special dispatch from Carl Ackerman, then at American Field Headquarters in Siberia :
"In Khabarovsk the Russians believe that the Bolshevist life is measured by the ability of Germany's military to hold out. With the splendid advance in the west, every foot gained is also a gain in Russia, because Germany is being weakened here, too. Once her prestige is destroyed, the power of the Bolsheviki will crumble."
That was a bad guess. But it was reinforced by propaganda coming from the ever-ready "Russian Information
Bureau "The general strike here, which lasted three days, must not be considered as a mere local disturbance, but as of international interest, because it shows the extent of the mischief which the Russian Bolsheviki have already succeeded in doing. It is now known that the Bolshevist agents in Switzerland intended to organize a sanguinary revolution, hoping to extend it to the neighboring countries, Italy and France."
Etc.
That same day the Times published a dispatch from Washington, stating that while "no definite word" had been received, "recent reports from London have been taken by some observers to indicate that Great Britain may propose the sending of additional troops into Russia to place the country on a stable footing and eliminate the Bolsheviki." A,new note, you observe, was appearing.
It was not "to establish an easttern front" that this dispatch suggested Great Britain might send troops into Russia : it was "to place the country on a stable footing and eliminate the Bolsheviki." The note was a popular one. That day, editorially, the Times cast its die. "The fault which the AlIies are committing in the front of their new enemy, the Bolsheviki," it said, "is the same they have so long committed in front of their old enemy, the German autocracy. They allowed the enemy all the 'advantages of the offensive, and merely resisted at whatever point the enemy ch,ose In ,turn to attack . . . . Similarly the Bolshevi,st assault on civilization has all the advantages <of the offensive . . . . As f'or the fear 'that advance into Russia would or might contaminate the soldiers of the advancing force by bringing them into contact with Bolshevist argument, that merely means only a postponement of the evil day, ftor ,the Bolsheviki are on the off ensive and will bring that argument home to the West without delay.
When they do they will be stronger and more powerful than they are now. The Allies can fight Bolshevism now, before its teeth have 'grown, and run the risk of having the cruder minds among their soldiers debauched by the argument that ignorance should rule knowledge; or they can wait until Bolshevism has spread that argument through the cruder minds not only of their armies but of their whole populations, and then fight it with their morale ,thus impaired. It ought to be a choice easy to make." Tmhe front had changed. "Their new enemy, the Bolsheviki"-"the Bolsheviki are on the offensive" -"Allies can fight Bolshevism now," or "they can wait"-"it ought to lbe a choice easy to make." Thus by the end of 1918, seven weeks after the armistice, was the transition effected.
Gone was the old enemy-Germany.
In Germany's place, demanding more cannon and platoons, stood the "new enemy"-Soviet Russia. we know (by this time) that there were also certain others, both in Siberia and in European Russia, that gave equal loyalty to the Soviets.
A declaration of support by a democratic assembly, either in favor of Kolchak or in favor of Lenin, is a news event of somewhat similar importance.
Is it the true function of a newspaper and a press association to report or to ignore such events without discrimination?
In the Times you will find sixteen reports* of declarations by Zemstvos, trade unions and other bodies, in favor of the Kolchak government.
There is no similarly complete record of that gradual accretion of power which the Soviets must have had, to stay on top in Moscow.
Emphaiis is an important factor in journalism. It is sometimes achieved simply by silence. Section III of this review gives a resumi of the various reports of revolt in Soviet Russia, of strikes and of revolutions.
It is fair to say that whenever the Soviets were suspected of being in trouble, and of course they were in trouble, the entire civilized world knew of it the following morning. 'Was Kolchak never in trouble?
He was, to be sure, harrassed by bandit leaders like Semenoff, and Kalmykoff .t But the Times had an explanation% for his failure to rid himself of such gentry: "In spite of the demands of his war with the Bolsheviki, he [Kolchak] made preparations once, if not twice, to send a military expedition against these two Cossack adventurers, with the object of restoring all Siberia to allegiance to the Omsk government.
Americans returned from Siberia say that this vindication of authority was halted by the military representatives of a foreign government, who find the Cossack leaders useful for their own pur-* Jan. g, Igrg; Jan. 18; Jan. 27; ApriI 6; May 21; May 22 ; June I ; June 7 ; June I I ; June 13 ; July 22 ; July is ; July 31; Aug. 3 ; Sept. 27 ; Nov. 23. To the reporting of Admiral Kolchak's activities the field it has seemed worth while to devote a separate section of this study.
That section follows. For Kolchak's activities as a statesman, the Czechs may speak.
They knew and served him best:
"By guarding and maintaining order, our army has been forced against its convictions to support a state of absolute despotism and unlawfulness which has had its beginnings here under defense of the Czech arms.
"The military authorities of the Government of Omsk are permitting criminal actions that will stag-THE NEW REPUBLIC August 4, 1920 ger the entire world. The burning of villages, the vent this lawlessness. murder of masses of peaceful inhabitants and the "Thus our passiveness appears as a direct conseshooting of hundreds of persons of democratic conquence of the principles of neutrality and non-intervictions and also those only suspected of political disference in Russian internal affairs, and we are loyalty occurs daily. The responsibiliity for this bebecoming apparent participants in these crimes as a fore the peoples of the world will fall on us, inasresult of our observing absolute neutrality." (Times,  much 
Re-Enchantment
As later events demonstrated, the judgment in that editorial was entirely sound. Kolchak's day was done.
But consider, for a moment, the consequences of "Kolchak Beaten" : Kolchak was "the All-Russian Government." He had been groomed for leadership.
Suppose that he had failed?
Suppose it was clear that he had lost his chance to get to Moscow? There might, in that case, have been two queries working their way insidiously into American opinion. And on October 13, a wireless message from Omsk to London claimed again that "the Bolsheviki are retreating along the whole line." According to a London dispatch:
An extraordinary offensive it had been indeed. It never got within four hundred miles of its objective. It ended two thousand miles behind the line from which it started.
On its behalf, when it was moving westward, extravagant claims were put forward; in retreat, there was constant assurance that an early turn was coming.
Failure of the Allies to send war material was the chief cause of Kolchak's rout? Y,ou will find Times editorials to assure you of that. But you will find also Mr. Lloyd George, saying in the IHouse of Common, on Nsovember 8: "We have given real proof of our sympathy for the men of Russia who have helped the Allied cause, by sending one hundred million sterling worth of material and support -of every form." "The message also reports that a Bolshevist wireless dispatch had been received which admitted that in a plebiscite in MOSCOW, the workmen had declared themselves against the Soviet and as supporting But he marched on a bed of quicksand. It would be easy, however, to overstress the importance of the political side of the Denikin adventure.
Kolchak, not Denikin, was the protagonist of democracy in Russian intervention.
Denikin counted by virtue of his army. That army, for many months, stood between the American public and a realistic appraisal of the situation in Russia. How effectively, a summary of the Denikin offensive will perhaps reveal.
IX.
The Denikin Qffensive
There would be little value in tracing day by day the news reports of the campaign in southern Russia. The campaign does not fall into the more ,or less clearly marked phases that characterize the Kolchak offensive in the East. Furthermore, its advances and retreats are more local in character. There is not always a general movement of the line.
Reports of successes in the Caucasus appear simultaneously with reports of reverses farther west.
Nor is it the purpose of this study to write the detailed annals of that campaign.
Its purpose is rather to review the variaous news dispatches that reached the -American reader, and to indicate their character.
Cities in South Russia, of course, meant very little to the American public. The fall of Vladikavkaz, of Paulograd, of Kamishin, had no significance for the ordinary reader. But the capture of troops and guns and war material was another matter. One thousand prisoners on Tuesday, two thousand on Friday, a steady iteration of this sort of news inevitably produces an effect upon the mind of any reader.
A second factor of importance, from the standpoint of the present discussion, is the extent to which the American reader was either rightly guided or misled, by the conclusions which correspondents drew from actual achievements in the field. It is with an eye upon these two factors, particularly, that this review of General Denikin's campaign is written. June was the month in which the Soviet armies began their counter-offensive against Kolchak in the East. Troops from the South may have been diverted, and, from the Soviet point of view, diverted wisely. But the loss of the Donetz regi'on must certainly have been a serious one.
Aside from this success, however, there was no great shift in the situation in the South, during the months of Spring.
Denikin managed to push his troops north as far as Paulograd (which might be compared to an advance as far as McAlester, Oklahoma, on the push towards Des Moines).
Nevertheless, there were more or less open promises of great things soon to come.
The Times on June 24 printed a special cable from Mr. Harold Williams, declaring the rout of Bolshevism on the Ekaterinodar fr'ont to be "marvellously complete." There was also news of trouble on the inside of Soviet Russia.
A dispatch from the Washington Office of the Times reported, on April 22, news reaching the State Department that "the LeninTrotzky r6gime is beginning to crack." A special dispatch from Geneva, published on the same day, asserted that the government was "menaced by an entirely new revolutionary movement." And on May 24, the Times gave its readers a report more promising still :
"LondOn, May 2;.-The entire Bolshevist structure in Russia appears to be crumbling. "The evacuation of Rgoscom, the head centre of Bolshevism, has begun, according to reports brought from Petrograd to Copenhagen by travelers, and forwarded by the Exchange Telegraph Company. . . ."
from London.) Later in the month, 5,500 more prisoners, IO more guns, and three armored trains were added.
That brought the total for prisoners to 55,500, for the guns (including machine guns) to 740. These figures let us carry over.
Midsummer
Denikin's army, by the first of July, had become the chief hope of the interventionists.
The Kolchak offensive in the East had collapsed.
Kolchak was back at the line from which he started. But Denikin was the new hope of Russia.
During the months of July and August the antiBolshevist forces in the South took from the Bolsheviki a half dozen cities of some importance. Odessa was their chief prize-although, throughout the campaign in the South-the fact that an Allied fleet patrolled the Black Sea made Odessa a point of less real value to the S'oviets than it might otherwise have been. Nevertheless, the reports narrating this advance (to a point 375 miles removed from its 'objective) were often put in such a way that a complete collapse of the Bolshevik defensive was made to seem likely.
Thus Mr. Williams asserted, in a cable published on the 13th of July: "There is really nothing now to prevent a rapid break through to Moscow, provided communications could be secured and civil administration be guaranteed. . . ." Headlines told much the same story: headlines such as these seem to put him very near that ultimate success which (as events demonstrated) he was due never to attain?
There was again, in August, the familiar run of prophecy and rumor of domestic crises facing the Soviets.
On August 5, the Times published an Associated Press dispatch from Paris, quoting the opinion of a former Kerensky Minister that "perhaps the bottom would drop from the resistance of the Bolsheviki." A week later, a headline in the Times announced: "Strikes All Over Russia"-with a report that Lenin intended quitting his post. Notice how this report came to the American reader from its original source, whatever and wherever that source may have been. The Times got it from some unidentified news service. This service got it from its representative in Gpenhagen. That representative got it from "dispatches from Helsingfors." And those dispatches, finally, were based on "Russian reports."
Where these "reports" in turn had their source, there was nothing in the dispatch to indicate.
Before leaving the midsummer phase of the campaign in the South, it is worth noting that during the months of July and August there were announced in Denikin's behalf captures amounting to 74,-ooo prisoners, 60 guns, ISO machine guns, 130 locomotives, Late in August a dispatch from London (August 2 I) reported that "the latest information" indicated the strength of the Soviet armies on the southern front to be 146,000. Denikin's captures, then, by the end of August, had amounted to almost as many prisoners as there were troops left in the army opposing him.
Denikin's Farthest Worth
Two hundred miles from Moscow, it might be represented in the advance upon Des Moines which we have imagined, by a point near Topeka, Kansas. Beyond Orel, Denikin managed ,to throw a part of his army.
But there the tide turned back. The present period was marked, as the earlier ones had been, by repeated stories of trouble behind the lines of the Soviet army.
Taken by themselves, these stories were enough tbo keep alive the myth that Soviet power might soon be broken; coupled with some of the prophecy and suggestion contained in the report of the offensive, there may have seemed to be no doubt about it. On September 2S, for instance, headlines in the Times announced :
Staff correspondents of the Times in Washington, and in Europe, reported that chances seemed good for an early and a complete success. Readers of the Times were informed, on October 2 I, of the confidence of such an outcome "in diplomatic circles" in Washington.
"Diplomatic circles" often imparts of?icial color to a dispatch without 'the assumption of responsibility.
On the present occasion "diplomatic circles" were reported to feel that "a few more successes" for the White armies and "the Bolshevist leaders would make a fresh attempt to negotiate peace." "It is the impression here, however, that none of the anti-Bolshevist leaders will consider anything but unconditional surrender, and the punishment of the Soviet chieftains."
But though its news columns exhaled an air of early victory, the Times, it must be said, was more cautious editorially.
Had the Kolchak fiasco been a warning?
"Lenin is still strong," said the Times on September 25, "but he is far weaker than he seemed to be a few weeks ago."
Weak indeed, if the correspondents of the Times might be relied upon.
Mr. Walter Duranty, cabling on October S, reported "the growing opinion" in Paris, "that the days of the present Bolshevist rigime are numbered" and that the government of Lenin "will be overthrown from within." News of the sort of thing Mr. Duranty may have had in mind appeared in the Times a few days later (October It was the month and a half beginning early in ,ij : September that saw Denikin at his best. His troops during that period ,occupied a number of It had been estimated, let us remember, on the basis of "the latest informati,on," that on August 2 I, ,the Soviet forces on the southern front amounted to 146,000 troops.
Since that date, Denikin's announced captures had amounted to I 15,600. There was left, then, the small force of 30,400 men to defend Msoscow (assuming there had been no one killed or wounded; in that case there would have been fewer still).
Other troops were rushed in as reinforcements?
Presumably. But let us remember, too, that during the time with which we are now dealing, the Bolsheviki were also operating against Kol,chak in the East-a thousand miles away from M~oscow. Just how inexhaustible were the troops and the supplies of this tottering and distracted government? Total the figures given in these tables, and you will find that between April 1st and late October Denikin's forces captured 1,008 guns (of various sorts) and no fewer than 245,100 Bolsheviki.
And yet, there came a turnine of the tide.
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D&kin in Retreat
The turning, we have said, came, in late October. There were, 'to be sure, later offensives on Denikin's part, some of them recovering considerable territory.
But from this time forward, most ot Denikin's announced successes were on one flank or another.
He pressed no nearer Mosccw. Revolts behind his ,own line, in Ukrainia, were costly. By the end of November, Soviet troops were 120 miles south of Orel.
Three weeks more, and they had recovered Kiev and Kharkov.
A,t that point, a dispatch from London (December 18) summarized the opinion of the British War Office: Or was there once more that false note of optimism, keeping alive the old belief 'that there was no need of revaluating our policy of intervention?
Let us examine a few of Mr. Harold Williams's dispatches, printed in the Times not in the first days of the retreat, but after a summary 'of British War Office opinion had reported that Denikin was falling back "along a vast front" and that there appeared to be no military reason "why the Reds should not continue to advance." From Denikin's headquarters in South Russia, on December 16, Mr. Williams sent this message to counteract any "wrong impression" :
"The spectacular fall of Kharkov may easily give a wrong impression of the situation here. It is necessary, therefore, to say that in Denikin's armies there is no impression or expectation of defeat. The losses during the retreat have been small, and great has been the army's disappointment at leaving the area recently conquered.
There are not the faintest symptoms of dkbicle, and the determination to win is as strong as ever. . . ."
Mr. Williams, all along, had the disadvantage of poor cable communications.
There was, accordingly, little snap left in his prophecies by the time they 32 THE NEW actually got published. The present message appeared in the Times on December 27-and by that time Soviet armies were eighty miles southwest of the city whose loss Mr. Williams had minimized.
Again, from Novorossysk, on January 12, Mr. Williams cabled that Denikin's army had "been greatly strengthened by the infusion of fresh troops"; but two days after this report had f'ound its way to New York and appeared in print (January 2 I ), a Moscow wireless announced that Soviet troops were within six miles of the Black Sea at Perekop.
On February 2, Mr. Williams, cabled (again from Novorossysk) that "the position at the front is steadily improving."
In fact, "the morale of the Bolshevist troops seems suddenly to have collapsed."
But that optimistic message did nut get ,into print until February 18. And in the Times of that same date appeared a Moscow wire- August 4, 1920 less announcing that Denikin's army had subsequently been driven back to the Sea of AZOV.
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With this sort of alternately exploded and reviving optimism, the campaign in southern Russia died gradually away. Denikin's offensive, like Kolchak's, showed how little popular support the interventionists could muster. Denikin, like Kolchak, drew supplies and equipment from the Allies. Probably he was even better cared for. But he could not march to Moscow, he could not even hold the line from which he started, because behind him there was no body of genuine enthusiasm. For Den&in's offensive, as for Kolchak's, great claims were made in the campaign's early stages. And when the' later stages came, when Denikin's troops were driven hundreds of miles by the beaten armies of a tottering government, at least one voice was raised to cry "This can't be true!"
That voice belonged to the correspondent of the Times.
X. The West Front
From Kolchak and Denikin we turn to the West front, omitting from this study the question of intervention in the North. That chapter is not included because this is primarily a study of Russian news, not Russian history, and the news from Archangel-throughout the period of Allied occupation -was limited principally to brief reports of military engagements.
We believe that there were developments in Archangel, particularly in the dictatorship of Russian civil government exercised by Allied soldiers, which failed to receive adequate description in the Times. We have chosen, however, throughout this study to limit our case primarily to the news as printed.
Partly for that reason, and partly because the Archangel adventure was never on the main track t,o some new "All-Russian Government," we pass over an experiment both disingenuous and disastrous. On the West front intervention never attained the scope it had in the East and South: There were neither Czechoslovaks nor Don and Kuban Cossacks upon whom it could be based. The offensives were the work of Finns and Letts and other border peoples, assisted by certain numbers of anti-Bolshevist Russians.
To such forces the French and British governments lent aid. The French supplied military advisers; the British dispatched warships to the Gulf of Finland;
and both governments furnished materials of war.
But while interventi,on in the West was upon a scale more limited than that upon the other fronts, it played nevertheless an important part in the familiar process of convincing the western world that Soviet power was cracking, and that foreign . armies would be welcomed by the Russian people. There were two off ensives in-the West: on; in*the Spring of 1919, which the Finns and Esthonians started; the other in the Fall, chiefly the affair of the "Northwestern Army" under Yudenitch. Why the Finns and Esthonians should have been so concerned about law and order in Russia as to want to invade the country, remains a question still unanswered.
The Spring Offensive
Petrograd, of course, was the objective of both campaigns in the West.
To its assailants, the city offered none of the tremendous distances involved in an advance upon Moscow.
It lay just across the border from Finland, not much more than a hundred miles from the eastern line of Esthonia. At home, in their own capitals, the Esthonians and the Finns were nearer Petrograd than either Kolchak or Denikin ever got to Moscow.
The first offensive in the West began late in April, 1919. On May 2, the Times published an unidentified dispatch from Helsingfors announcing that Petr'ograd was "being evacuated by the Bolsheviki."
This dispatch was based on "reports from reliable sources."
Two days lamter, there appeared on the first page of the Times the headline:
PETROGRAD REPORTED WON The source of this news was another unidentified dispatch, this time from Paris: "Petrograd has probably been taken by the Finns, according to information believed to be trustworthy, which has reached Paris."
But though "reports from reliable sources" and "information believed to be trustworthy," were thus encouraging, Petrograd was not doomed to fall this early in the Spring.
It simply disappeared from the news for a few days-and then a fresh start was made.
On These headlines marked the high tide of the first offensive.
What happened afterwards is not quite clear.
There was a report, several weeks later, (Reval to Helsingfors to London to New York, published June 17) that the naval base of Kronstadt was about to be captured by anti-Soviet armies.
But a little later (July 7) the Esthonian Bureau announced quite unexpectedly that the attacking army had "suffered a reverse."
It was "now in full retreat."
The first offensive was ended.
., ,I/,
But not without results. Twice Petrograd had been evacuated.
Three times it had fallen. And since the collapse of the attacking army received nothing like the headlines and the news position that went to the "evacuations" and the "falls," a reader of the Times might be pardoned if he found himself, at the end of the offensive, believing the hold of the Soviets on Petrograd a tenuous one at best. in an editorial the quality of its news. The four reports had been based respectively on a dispatch received in Stockholm;
on "the lztest official advices" received in London;
on "a telegram received at the Russian Embassy in Paris"; and on a statement of the British War Office plus "a message from Helsingfors."
Coming on successive days they marked the high point of success for Yudenitch. During the week that followed, sensational headlines disappeared.
There There is no criticsm to be made of a newspaper or a press service for reporting the <opinions of Polish or any other statesmen, provided such opinions come clearly labelled.* Collecting such material is part of the business of news-gathering. But is it not another matter if the propaganda of statesmen appears in the form of news? We quote a few dispatches descriptive of the relations between Poland and Soviet Russia.
In our opinion it is fair to say that in the guise of news they picture Russia, and not Poland, as the aggressor as early as January, IgIg.
What was the actual situation, at the time each dispatch was filed? 
When Intervention Failed
One section more will serve to bring this study to an end; for with the collapse of intervention, in the last months of I 9 19, relations between Russia and the AlIied world entered a deadlock during which a single, easily discernible note has dominated the news of Russia, as that news finds expression in the columns of the Times.
Before turning to this final chapter, however, it is worth while to note one factor which in our opinion played a substantial part in keeping many Americans satisfied that there was no better policy to be adopted towards Russia, from February to November, I 9 I 9, than the policy of helping White Guards make their wars. This factor is the inadequate and therefore misleading fashion in which were reported the several efforts of the Allied Powers, during that period, to give their policy a new turn.
Of The message adds: 'The extent to which the Soviet Government is prepared to meet the Entente will depend on its military position in relation to that of the Entente Governments, and it must be emphasized that its position improves every day '. " This constitutes the full reply of 'the Soviet government, as printed in the Times.
And it lends itself to M. Tardieu's interpretation. For though it considers other subjects, in it there is not a word about willingness to suspend hostilities.
Compare, however, this abbreviated version of the reply with the full statement as now published in "Russian-American
Relations."* In this complete statement the Soviet government declares itself "anxious to secure an agreement that would put an end to hostilities"
; it is, in fact, ready to discuss "the question of annexation of Russian territories by the Entente Powers," or by "forces which . . . receive financial, technical, military, or any other support from them"-in other words, Kolchak and Denikin.
What is the meaning of this discrepancy between the complete and the abridged versions of the Soviet reply?
Simply this: that whoever prepared the abridged version for publication-whether government censor or correspondent or editor-omitted from thalt version the 'offer of the Soviet government to conclude an armistice-and that subse-' quently. it was on the ground of Soviet unwillingness 'to quit fighting that M. Tardieu, official representative of France, justified the abandonment of the whole plan. The Allies may indeed have been unwilling to trust the word of the Russian government-though to it they addressed a formal proposal.
The fact remains that Americans who relied on the Times' version of the Soviet reply were * "Russian-American Relations, rqr7-rg2o" (page 298 have been unwilling to face it, when it came. But this was not the phase of the question suggested to the American public by the abridged version of the Russian reply published in the Times.
That abridged version declared the Soviet reply lto be: "at will be impossible to give up fighting." The proposal for a general peace was entirely omitted.
Six days later (May 20) the Times published this second dispatch-a tombstone marking the burial spot of Dr. Nansen's plan: "Paris, May r8.-There is a general impression that the reply of M. Tchitcherin, Bolshevist Foreign Minister of Russia, to Dr. Fridtjof Nansen's proposals to feed Russia, brings the whole project to a close. The reply is generally accepted here as, in effect, a refusal by the Bolsheviki to cease attempting to invade their neighbors' territory. . . ."
War's End
The failure of the Nansen plan and of the Prinkipo conference, with the subsequent and equally dismal failure of the three White Generals, brought the Allies through their second year of indecision and left them, at the end of 1919, no nearer peace in Eastern Europe than 'they had been before.
The p eriod which followed, the period with which this study closes, may be said to have had its beginning 'in November, 1919. By that time there was little hope left of success for the Whi'te armies.
Kolchak was "falling back rapidly" in Siberia (Associated Press dispatch dated October 29) ; Yudenitch had had his second try at Petrograd, and missed ist; Denikin had touched his farthest north, and now was facing south again. Winter promised little to the imerventionists.
Out of ,the failure of the White Generals might have come, in ,those days of early winter, a break in the current of American opinion. Intervention was discredited.
So was the Imyth of a Soviet Government perpetually tottering on the brink of destruction.
If (the Soviets were there to stay, even 'though th'eir s'tay lbe temporary, was it not necessary to revaluate the policy of ,the Allies? Reports of atrocities-there had bee'n scores of such reports, during I9 I9-had kindled 'in American opinion no feeling of respect or friendliness for the Soviet Government.
But war had failed. W.ar in Eastern Europe meant no peace for the rest ,of the world. Why not ,try peace with Russia?
Not peace in its diplomatic sense, probably, with loans and treaties, and all that may accompany formal recognition. But peace in the sense of having nothing more to do with playing favorities, with dispatching arms to one faction at the expense of another.
Peace, 'too, in the matter of the blockade, with medicines for a stricken country, and a resumption of trade relations provisional upon good behavior in respect to "international propaganda."
Some such policy, we (believe, was a natural outgrowth of the factors in the Russian situation at the end of 1919-an outgrow,th of the failure of intervention, of the nat,ural reaction from war towards peace, and of the uneasiness that must have been growing in the minds of many normally generous Americans over a policy which condemned to starvation and to death by disease ,many Russian men and women innocent of all complicity in the Soviet adventure.
Wfhat prevented these opinions from ripening into insistence upon a re-assessment of American policy toward Russia? Doubtless a number of different factors played their part.
One factor, we believe, f,alls within the range of this present study: the character of the news about Russia (coming in a rush during 'the final period with which we are now dealing.
From .the time the three Wlhite Generals had started their off ensives until the winter months came round, the dominant note in the news-as the foregoing sections amply illustrated-had been one of all-pervading optimism. Kolchak and Denikin were on more than one occasion advancing upon Moscow-Yudenitoh, upon Petrograd. And from within Soviet Russia, we remember, came many r.eports of crises and counter-revolutions heralded in headlines as foreshadowing the doom of Soviet power.
In the months between March and November, 1919, there was little in the news about Red Peril.
White was triumphant. Once before, in such a moment 'as this, when Allied diplomacy had come squarely to the cross-roads, the Red Peril played a part in 'turning it from peace. That, as an earlier se'ction of this study has told, was immediately after the armistice-when there was no longer motive for reconstituting an eastern front, and when reason pointed to a withdrawal of troops from alien soil. Then the Red Peril appeared-furnishing a new cause f,or intervention. Once again, at the present cross-roads, that Peril emerged from the oblivion to which the past six months had relegated it-and cast its shadow on the sky.
Early November ( 1919) marked its reappearance. On the 10th of that month the Times printed a special cable from London. "Attempts were made in several countries over the week-end," it read, "to put into operation an ambitious program of a 'Red' international effort at a world rising in support of Bolshevism."
Four days later appeared another dispatch from London : LENIN Bolsheviki have captured Alexandrovsk, capital of the island of Sakhalin, and fear is felt that the radical forces may enter Japan proper, according to a special cable dispatch from the Tokio correspondent of Nippu Jiji, Honolulu Japanese language newspaper. . . . "The best canvass of opinion in well-informed circles in Washington indicates that the Russian Bolshevist movement is now to be regarded primarily as a military menace rather than as a political one-a menace that should be dealt with militarily and crushed militarily, just as the threat of German militarism and imperialism against the world's safety, which loomed larger when the German drives began in the Spring of 1917, almost simultaneously with the entry of the United States into the world war, had to be met militarily." Now and then there was peril which the American Government #itself took a hand in advertising. Thus the Times on February 7, 1920, under headlines asserting "Reds Raising Army To Attack India," carried a dispatch beginning in the following fashion :
What was to be the Allied program?
Those inSpecial to the New York Times.
Washington, Feb. 6.-A brief but significant announcement was issued by the State Department today, based on its official advices, to the effect that the Bolsheviki were endeavoring to establish military bases in Turkestan for a campaign against India.
timately familiar with ,the &uation had ready solution :
"It has now become clear to men intimately familiar with the situation that the Bolshevist military menace must be smashed and that in President Wilson's phrase, it can be met only with 'force without stint'." a To a long train of similar dispatches picturing the Red Peril these two were the forerunners. Those which followed touched on many themes.
Aside from the idea of general peril there was, for instance, the special peril menacing the Baltic States. Thus on December I 7 ( 19 19) the Times published a special dispatch from Washington, asserting that the Soviets were attempting '(to dragoon the Esthonians into acceptance of impossible demands in the face of military pressure." A high official in the State Department 'had summarized for the correspondent his idea of the Russi'an tactics:
"These demands," said a high official of the State Department today, in an authorized statement having the indorsement of Secretary Lansing, "which would make Esthonia essentially a part of Bolshevist Russia, are being enforced by determined military attacks upon the Esthonian front. . . ."
Yet when Peace was signed. seven weeks later, a * Esthonia, according to accounts in the Times, February 3, 4, and 6, 1920, received full recognition of her independence ; fifteen million rubles in gold ; exoneration from her proportional share in the repayment of Imperial Russia's debt; and preferential rights to a concession for building and exploiting direct railway connections between Moscow and the Esthonian frontier. Times headlines announced February 15, however, that the Esthonian peace was onIy a "Lenin makeshift," and that Lenin had declared the terms would "be quite different when local Reds . v , get control." 39 "The department's information," says the official announcement, "is to the effect that in Turkestan the Bolsheviki are recruiting natives and war prisoners into new units and are establishing military bases said to be preliminary to a campaign against India."
As authority for this statement the Department cited an intercepted wireless message from Moscow to Tashkend, on December 6, 1919, announcing that "a propaganda train for organization an'd instructive purposes will be diepatched to Turkestan." This intercepted wireless was all of the documentary proof brought forward.
Nothing in the published report was said of any propaganda outside of Turkestan.
Was the State Department (guilty of more than one sl,ip in the past) forgetful of the fact THE NEW that Turkestan had been p.art of Russia when the Tsar sat on the throne?
Was it no longer a part of Russia?
The one solid 'thing in the State Department's memorandum was an intercepted wireless, and that wireless proved only that the Government of Russia was attempting the no doubt ,hazardous experiment of winning the Mohammedans of Russians Turkestan by propaganda instead of simply by the bayonet in the manner of the Tsar.
Red Peril Again "
To gauge the effect of steady repetition, and to mark the sources from which material for that repetition was drawn, take the news of a single month. We have chosen January of the year 1920.
For the present purpose that is an im'portant month because it was then that final elimination of the last of the three White Generals had begun to prepare the way for new rumors that the Allies contemplated peace with Russia. The Red Peril, in that month, wa,s a 'frequent visitor: January 5 * : Mr. Duranty cables from Riga that he has obtained copies of letters written to Moscow by a capt,ured courier, and that they prove Moscow is working for "the establishment of universal dictatorship of the proletariat and Soviet rule." January 9 : "Official quarters" describe the Bolshevist menace in the Middle East as ominous. (Special cable from London,) January
"It is asserted" that the Soviets plan an offensive against the British in India.
(Unidentified dispatch, Londmon.) January I I : "Allied officials and diplomats" envisage "a possible invasion of Europe." (Special dispatch from Washington.) January 13 : "Allied diplomatic circles" fear an invasion of Persia.
(Another special from Washington.) January I 6 : "British military authorities" expect an attack on Persia.
( 
REPUBLIC
August 4, 1920 January 2 I : "A dispatch to the Central News from Paris" states that the Supreme Council will send 200, 000 troops to oppose the Soviets in the Caucasus.
(A ssociated Press, London.) January 22 : "The best military and diplomatic intelligence received in Washington" expects a massed attack against Poland.
(Special dispatch from Washington.) January 23 : "Poland's diplomats" expect a million Soviet troops to be sent against them.
(Mr. James, cabling from Paris.) January 30 : "The French Foreign Office has received from its agents in India a report saying that the Bolsheviki are making extensive preparations for an uprising in India against the British." (Mr. James again.) Fourteen dispatches in the month of January, . warning of Red Peril to India and Poland, Europe and Azerbaijan, Persia, Georgia and Mesopotamia. That, averaged, is a dispatch almost every alternate day throughout the mont,h. The net effect was certainly towards checking growth of an opinion that Russia's failure to rally to the interventionists had demonstrated the need of a new policy-of considering the Soviets as an authority with which some sort of truce could and must be made. You cannot make truce with Peril.
There is, of course, the point of view which regards as wholly desirable this checking of the growth in pubhc opinion towards support of a new po&cy. The reiterated warnings of Red Peril, according to this point of view, performed a useful public service. That, certainly, is a logical attitude -and it is no part of our task to dispute it. We are discussing not Russian policy but Russian news. It seems to us important, however, not only to note the fact that such dispatches appeared with regularity during a period when they were most useful, but also to mark the sources from which they were drawn : letters of a captured courier, "official quar;;rs" (London), "allied officials and diploy$ hJ~as~wzt~dI . "allied diplomatic circles" as m on , Brltlsh military authorities" (London), "expert military opinion" (London), "well-informed diplomats" (Washington), information "placed before the three Premiers" (Paris), "a dispatch to the Central News from Paris" (London), "the best military and diplomatic intelligence received in Washington," "Poland's diplomats," agents of the French Foreign Office in India. There are certain sources here-the last, for instancewhich seem more definite and responsible than certain others.
But to us it seems fair comment that taken as a whole, with their reliance upon unidentified "experts"
and "diplomats" and upon "official quarters" where rumor invariably finds its favorite haven, particularly with the subordinate, these sources represent in fact a fairly irresponsible asAugust 4, I920 THE NEW sortment. The impression that they had their inspiration in rumor rather than in fact, it must be added, is heightened by contrasting them with what has actually happened subsequent to their publication. Five months have passed since January.
But it was Poland, and not Russia, that first started an offensive.
Soviet troops have indeed been landed in a Persian port (Enzeli) , but there they went in pursuit of a Russian fleet which had landed there bef'ore them-Denikin's-and a dispatch to the London Herald states they have subsequently 'been withdrawn.* There has been no uprising in India.
Nor has there been an invasion of India. There has been no invasion of Mesopotamia.
The most sensational, in fact, of all these January dispatches, was as sensationally contradicted on the very day f,ollowing its publication.
January a contrast between rumor and fact would-even were there no other reasons for doubt-raise legitimate suspicion concerning the accuracy of other news pitched in a similar key.
It is on the note of the Red Peril that this study ends. It has appeared at every turn to obstruct the restoration of peace in Eastern Europe and Asia, and to frustrate the resumption of enonomic life. The Allied proposal in January to open trade relations was speedily labelled "nothing more than a tactical political move" on the part of the Allied Governments (special dispatch from Washington to the Times, January 22).
In that way, too, have been tagged successive offers coming fr,om Russia. "There has been no doubt at any time in Washington official circles," said a special dispatch to the Times, March 14, "that the Soviet 'peace' drive represented nothing more than a scrap-of-paper policy of the Soviet leaders, a mere tactical move, and that what they really sought was a breathing spell in which t'o concentrate their energies for a renewed drive toward world-wide revolution."
* See the Times, June 19, Igzo.
Each peace proposal, whichever side first launched it, a tactical move . . . . Meantime the Red Peril. That, with armed intervention no longer a possibility, was the propaganda in the news. And if the peace of the world had not hung in 'the balance it would have made an interesting stalemate.
.
Deductions
Assuming that the preceding chapters constitute at least a prima facie case for saying that the run of the news on one matter of transcendent importance to Americans has been dubious, what deductions are there to be drawn by the constructive critic of the press ? Primarily, we believe, that the professional standards of journalism are not high enough, and the discipline by which standards are maintained not strong enough, to carry the press triumphantly through a test so severe as that provided by the Russian Revolution.
First as to standards. The analysis shows how seriously misled was the Times by its reliance upon the official purveyors of information.
It indicates that statements of fact emanating from governments and the circles around governments as well as from the leaders of political movements cannot be taken as judgments of fact by an independent press. They indicate opinion, they are controlled by special purpose, and they are not trustworthy news. If, for example, the Russian Minister of War says that the armies of Russia were never stronger, that cannot be accepted by a newspaper as news that the armies of Russia are stronger than ever. The only news in the statement is that the Minister says they are stronger. By any high journalistic standard, the Minister's statement if it deals with a matter of vital importance is a challenge to independent investigation. The analysis shows that even more misleading than the official statement purporting to be a statement of fact, is the semi-official and semi-authoritative but anonymous statement. Such news is fathered by such phrases as:
"Officials of the State Department" "government and diplomatic sources" "reports reaching here" "it is stated on high authority that" Behind those 'phrases may be anybody, a minor bureaucrat, a dinner table conversation, hotel lobby gossip, a chance acquaintance, a paid agent. Dispatches of this type put the editor at home and the reader at the mercy of opinion that he cannot check, and it is time to demand that the correspondent take the trouble to identify his informants sufficiently to supply the reader with some means of estimating the character of the report. The analysis indicates also that even so rich and commanding a newspaper as the Times does not take seriously enough the equipment of the correspondent.
For extraordinarily diffi:cult posts in extraordinary times, something more than routine correspondents are required. Reporting is one of the most difficult professions, requiring much expert knowledge and serious education.
The old contention that properly trained men lack the "news sense" will not stand against the fact that improperly trained men have seriously misled a whole nation. It is habit rather than preference which makes readers accept news from correspondents whose usefulness is about that of an astrologer or an alchemist. Important as it is for the press to read lessons in efficiency to workingmen, employees and politicians, it is no less important for the press to study those lessons itself.
Measured by its responsibility and pretensions the efficiency of the newspapers is not what determined men could make it. The analysis shows further that at critical periods the time honored tradition of protecting news against editorials breaks down. The Russian policy of the editors of the Times profoundly and crassly influenced their news columns.
The office handling of the news, both as to emphasis and captions, was unmistakeably controlled by other than a professional standard.
So obvious is this fact, so blatant _ . . . .
is the intrusion of an editorial bias, that it will require serious reform before ,the code which has been violated can be restored. W,here is the power to Ibe found which can define the standards of journalism and enforce them? Primarily within the profession itself. We do not believe that the press can be regulated by law. Our fundamental reliance must be on the corporate tradition and discipline of the newspaper guild. It is for them to agree on a code of honor, as the Bar Associations and Medijcal Societies have agreed, and for them to watch vigilantly for infracti,ons of that code. As citizens they cannot escape this duty, and as members of a profession they are forced to it by the growing distrust which everywhere greets them. They,know that to-day they are feared but not intimately respected, and the sins of some are visited upon all.
But while the technical code of journalistic standards, the tradition anld the discipline belong to the guild, newspapers must be prepared for an increasing supervision from the readers of the press. Those readers will not simply "write letters to the editor" effective as such letters are. They will speak through organizations which will become centers of resistance.
The report on the steel strike made by the Interchurch World Movement is an example of such resistance to the newspaper reports of that strike.
The report on the activities of the Attorney-General 'by twelve lawyers for the Popular Government League is an example of resistance 'to the red hysteria 'of 19 19-20.
They illustrate the Ipoint that a powerful engine of criticism is appearing in the community which will no longer naively accept the current news on contentious questions.
With that fact 'the profession of journalism will have to make a reckoning.
